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these may be applicable in the context of dealing with terrorists is discussed. Although the content of 
criminal and terrorist rehabilitation programs will always differ, criminology can help to clarify issues, 
improve practice, and develop realistic expectations for rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists. 
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There is continued investment and attention being paid to programs of disengagement and deradicalisation 
(D&D) for Islamist terrorists. Whilst there is some evidence of positive effects of different programs, it is 
widely acknowledged that rehabilitative efforts with terrorists are in their infancy and that there is a great deal of 
potential for learning, development and refinement. The present article examines rehabilitation programs for 
Islamist militants in light of the literature on rehabilitative interventions for „ordinary‟ criminal offenders, which 
have been in development now for more than fifty years. Principles of best practice as well as challenges in the 
field of criminal corrections are outlined, and the extent to which these may be applicable in the context of 
dealing with terrorists is discussed. Although the content of criminal and terrorist rehabilitation programs will 
always differ, criminology can help to clarify issues, improve practice, and develop realistic expectations for 
rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists.     





Whilst processes of radicalisation have long been the subject of investigation, there is a 
steadily growing interest
1
 in examining the opposite end of the spectrum of terrorism- how 
organisations and individuals come to abandon violence and „deradicalise.‟ The goal of such 
research is to learn how we might facilitate the decline of terrorist movements. One strategy 
that has been gaining ground and publicity in recent years involves the implementation of 
rehabilitative programs of disengagement and deradicalisation (D&D) for individual Islamist 
militants.
2
 In particular, following pioneering efforts in Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and 
Singapore, rehabilitation-style interventions have been established in Malaysia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Iraq, Great Britain and the Netherlands, and are at various stages of planning and 
implementation in Afghanistan Thailand, Pakistan, and elsewhere around the world.
3
  
Given that one of the leading figures of al-Qaeda in Yemen, Said Ali Shari (featured 
in claims of responsibility for the December 25
th
, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest 
Airlines Flight 253 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab) is a former Guantanamo detainee who 
went through a Saudi-run „art-therapy rehabilitation program‟
4
 there is a pressing need to 
assess existing efforts at rehabilitation. 
Rehabilitation programs for jihadists are diverse, they are at different stages of 
development, and have released limited details of their operation. They nevertheless share the 
underlying assumption that it is possible to engage radical individuals and to persuade them 
to desist from involvement with terrorist organisations, and to relinquish existing 
commitment to violence. Barrett and Bokhari note that “[w]hile all [D&D] programmes have 
achieved progress, even despite growing experience it is still too early to say with any 
certainty that any have been fully successful. There are no established criteria of success and 
no standards that apply across cultures” [emphasis added].
 5
  
Given the relative infancy of the concepts of disengagement and deradicalisation 
within the field of terrorism studies, combined with the evident eagerness of governments to 
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implement such interventions and the need to identify areas of best practice, the current 
article seeks to explore what can be learned from the more established practice of 
rehabilitation with „ordinary‟ offenders. Although the relevance of theories of criminal 
desistance to understanding terrorist disengagement has previously been explored,
6
 parallels 
between respective rehabilitative interventions have not.  
First I consider distinctions between disengagement and deradicalisation at the 
individual and collective levels, with a view to placing individual processes of withdrawal 
from terrorism in context. Then I provide an overview of existing D&D programs, identifying 
common themes in practice as well as specific issues that require further attention. Following 
on from this, I describe rehabilitation efforts with ordinary offenders, including guidelines for 
best practice and organisational implementation. Finally, I consider the degree to which 
criminological theory and practice are relevant to working with Islamist militants, and offer 
tentative recommendations for the future development of rehabilitative programs for Islamist 
terrorists. 
Disengagement and Deradicalisation 
Building upon earlier work by Horgan,
7
 recent discussions of the decline of terrorism 
emphasise the importance of making analytical distinctions between interrelated behavioural 
and psychological, and individual and collective processes.
8
 The distinction between the 
behavioural and psychological refers to the fact that decisions to abandon violence may 
sometimes be behavioural only, e.g. for practical or involuntary reasons. Such cases do not 
necessarily include an ideological reappraisal of the use of violence or related extremist 
beliefs.
9
 Conversely, a person or group may come to believe that violence is not the answer 









Here the term „disengagement‟ will be used as by Bjørgo and Horgan
11
 to refer to the 
behavioural process, (which may or may not include changes in ideological commitment), 
while „deradicalisation‟ is used more specifically to refer to changes in belief, with a 
particular emphasis on the rejection of violence. It is important to note, however, that the 
relationship between behaviour and cognition is complex, and acting in a certain way can 
often give rise to supportive beliefs, rather than it necessarily being the other way around.
12
 
Intervention programs for Islamist extremists tend to place a general emphasis on trying to 
alter beliefs –whether or not they are successful- but they vary widely in practice and the 
„bottom line‟ or ultimate aim is to bring about behavioural change- i.e. cessation of terrorist 
involvement and abandonment of violence. They can thus be thought of as „risk reduction 
initiatives‟
13
 and will be referred to throughout this paper either as D&D programs or as 
rehabilitation programs for Islamist terrorists.  
Collective Disengagement 
Numerous case-studies of different types of terrorist group have detailed the decline of 
particular campaigns of violence and thereby contribute to the growing knowledge-base 
about what factors are involved in collective disengagement.
14
 Based on an analysis of events 
in Egypt and Algeria, Ashour
15
 distinguishes between three levels of „deradicalisation‟. 
Ideological deradicalisation involves a reasoned and justified rejection of violence, in 
accordance with the above definition. Behavioural deradicalisation involves the cessation of 
violent action as per „disengagement.‟ Finally, organisational deradicalisation involves 
collective acceptance and adherence to a strategy of disengagement within a particular 
organisation or movement. Ashour builds upon this to identify three types of collective 
„deradicalisation‟, which here will be termed disengagement: 1. Comprehensive 
disengagement, involving all three levels, i.e. an ideological, behavioural, and successful 
organisational rejection of violence, (e.g. the Egyptian Islamic Group) 2. Substantive 
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disengagement, involving ideological and behavioural levels, but with organisational 
disagreement and factionalising, (e.g. the Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and 3. Pragmatic 
disengagement, involving behavioural and organisational disengagement, but lacking an 
ideological component (e.g. the Algerian Islamic Salvation Army).   
Collective disengagement can occur for a variety of reasons
16
 and is best understood 
as a complex, contextually unique set of interactions between groups of terrorists, 
governments, their respective sympathisers and supporters, and competing groups.
17
 At the 
same time, internal organisational interactions are equally important.
18
 Among the factors 
that can contribute to the decline of terrorist organisations and decisions to disengage are both 
state repression and inducements, loss of public support, loss of leadership, unsatisfactory 
social relations within the organisation, failure to attract new members, recognition of failure 
to achieve goals, achievement of goals, and transitioning to alternative avenues of action 
(most notably political inclusion).
19
   
While it is possible to distinguish between these factors according to whether they are 
voluntary/involuntary or external/internal to the organisation, it is also quite obvious that they 
are all deeply interrelated and affect one another. Moreover, many variables can have 
multiple, contradictory effects regarding likelihood of disengagement (e.g. it is well known 
that repressive measures can also be counterproductive
20
), and so must be viewed in relation 
to other variables within the overall sequence and timing of events. To single out the 
leadership variable at the collective level, Demant, Slootman, Buijs and Tillie
21
 point out that 
disillusionment with leadership can lead to waning commitment and organisational 
disintegration. Meanwhile, Ashour
22
 identifies strong, charismatic leadership as the most 
crucial component of deliberate collective disengagement. Even when other variables were 
present (external and internal communication, repression, and selective inducements), 
disengagement in Egypt and Algeria was not successful unless directed by strong leaders.  





In addition to the nature of leadership, other key variables that are likely to be relevant 
across different scenarios of collective disengagement include:
23
 1. Organisational structure 
(a more united structure should facilitate internal communication and decrease the likelihood 
of factionalising), 2. Clarity of goals (more concrete goals are more negotiable and it is easier 
to recognise when they are not being achieved), 3. The nature of public support (widespread 
condemnation is highly influential to a group‟s failing attractiveness, while being tied to a 
particular ethnic/social identity may increase longevity), and 4. The existence of competing 
groups (the extent to which other violent or non-violent groups represent attractive 
alternatives). As Cronin observes, from a counter-terrorism perspective, “[t]he key is to work 
synergistically with the dynamics of terrorist groups [and] to recognize the conditions under 
which the [different factors identified] are either relevant or irrelevant to the exact 




Within the broader context of collective functioning it is also vitally important to have an 
appreciation of the concerns of individual group members (and especially so for planning 
programs of intervention that target individuals). As with collective disengagement, Horgan 
points out that individual processes can take many forms and may be physical and/or 
psychological, (either of which can arise in consequence from the other) as well as voluntary 
or involuntary.
25
 Furthermore, disengagement does not necessarily involve outright exit from 
a group, but can refer to role changes within an organisation (e.g. from combative to 
logistical or supportive).
26
 Hence disengagement at the individual, as with the collective, 
level must be seen as a process, not an event,
27
 and may involve numerous „failed‟ attempts 
before being successful.  
 Based upon research and intervention with violent, right-wing youth groups, Bjørgo
28
 
highlights a number of factors affecting individual disengagement, which are also relevant to 
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terrorism. These are divided into „push‟ factors, which represent dissatisfaction with the 
group, and include: 1. Negative experiences (stigmatisation, legal sanctions), 2. Loss of faith 
in ideology or politics, 3. The feeling that things are going too far, especially regarding 
violence, 4. Disillusionment with life inside the group (lack of loyalty, paranoia), 5. Loss of 
status within the group, and 6. Exhaustion or „burn-out‟ under pressure. At the same time 
there are „pull‟ factors, or alternative attractions, including: 1. Longing for a normal life, 2. 
Feeling „too old‟ for high-risk, demanding activity, 3. Concern for career/future, and 4. 
Family/relationship responsibilities.  
 In researching extremist groups in the Netherlands, Demant et al
29
 choose to dispense 
with the distinction between „push‟ and „pull‟, but nevertheless draw attention to similar 
factors. „Normative‟ (ideological) factors include rejection of violence, the realisation that the 
desired future is not attainable, and a changing view of society (no longer seeing it as the 
enemy, feeling a sense of belonging). „Affective‟ (social) factors affecting individual 
disengagement include a grim atmosphere within the group, disappointment with peers or 
leaders and internal disagreements. Finally, „continuance‟ (practical) factors are divided into 
those with a direct effect and those with an indirect effect. Practical factors with a direct 
effect include stigmatisation, external pressure and isolation (Bjørgo‟s push factors), whilst 
being drawn to establish one‟s own life exerts an indirect effect (Bjørgo‟s pull factors). 
 Combined, the above authors
30
 also identify the following potential inhibitors or 
barriers to disengagement: 1. Positive characteristics of the group (social-psychological 
dependence, also highlighted as a major barrier at the collective level
31
), 2. Fear of negative 
reprisals from other group members, 3. Loss of protection from former enemies, 4. Fear of 
legal sanctions (being „snitched‟ on, pressure from police), 5. Perceived lack of social, 
educational or vocational alternatives, 6. Loyalty to one‟s community and/or the cause, and 7. 
„Sunk cost,‟ i.e. not wanting to feel like effort and costs so far have been for nothing. 





Alternatively, individual decisions to disengage can be facilitated by triggering events (often 





Even from a brief review of the different variables which affect collective and individual 
disengagement it is clear that in reality these two processes cannot be separated. Individuals 
are affected by actions of and upon their group, while the group as a whole is also affected by 
the individual experiences of its members. Likewise, both are affected by, and in turn affect, 
the wider environment in which they operate.
33
 From the point of view of designing a 
program of intervention in order to facilitate individual disengagement and deradicalisation, it 
is of course individual-level analysis that is of most interest. Whilst considering individual 
motivations, however, it would seem prudent to pay close attention to group-members‟ 
organisational backgrounds, the current status/activities of the group or organisation(s) to 
which they belong(ed), and any ongoing changes that might affect individual perceptions. 
Having a broader contextual awareness is likely to prove invaluable to cultivating individual 
disengagement, (and by the same token, any assessment of program efficacy must also 





 „push‟/‟pull‟ distinction is useful in terms of emphasising the fact that 
people may disengage (and ultimately deradicalise) both as a result of „things that are bad‟ 
about being engaged in high-risk collective action, and as a result of „things that are good‟ 
about alternatives. The suggestion that „push‟ factors have a more direct effect on decisions 
to disengage is intriguing.
36
 This implies that interventions should focus on attempting to 
make negative aspects of organisational involvement salient before presenting attractive 
alternatives. 
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 Demant et al‟s
37
 identification of overlapping ideological, social and practical 
concerns are also valuable. Firstly, rejection of ideology does seem to occur in some 
instances but appears to play a very mixed role. For example, they report that individual 
reassessments of worldview played a major role in individual disengagement from the Dutch-
based Moluccan nationalist movement (no longer viewing violence as effective or legitimate, 
no longer regarding the Dutch as their enemy, and reassessing the necessity and feasibility of 
an independent Moluccan state).
38
 Likewise they report that among a small sample of former 
(non-violent) Islamic radicals, rejection of the austere Salafi worldview and lifestyle and a 
feeling of belonging to Dutch society were important.
39
  
However, specific ideological concerns played less of a role for members of the left-
wing squatters movement, and seemingly no role for former right-wing political activists 
whose views had changed little, and only then as a result, rather than a cause of 
disengagement.
40
 This echoes Bjørgo‟s assertion, commenting on violent right-wing groups, 
that “it is probably more common that beliefs change after leaving the group, and as a 
consequence, rather than before, and as a cause of leaving the group.”
41
   
Since the focus here is upon rehabilitative intervention, it must be recognised that in 
cases where participants are in custody, they are involuntarily physically disengaged. Simply 
being removed from their former environment may increase susceptibility to „cognitive 
openings‟
42
 that challenge their existing worldview, though conversely, beliefs may be 
sustained via other detainees or a stubborn resolve inspired by the experience of detention 
itself (and especially if treated harshly). A focus on ideology alone would therefore appear to 
be a limited approach. 
Social concerns appear to be at least as important as ideology with regards both to 
radicalisation
43
 and disengagement (including potential barriers to disengagement).
44
 Hence 
social attachments to other group members often precede ideological commitment and may 





exert a sense of obligation to continue even when disillusioned with the cause. On the other 
hand, unsatisfactory group relations can sew seeds of discontent which ultimately lead to 
decreased commitment and deradicalisation. Horgan
45
 points out in this regard that a 
perceived mismatch between one‟s idealised preconceptions about life in the group and the 
far less romantic reality can be a powerful experience.  
From the point of view of intervention, again it is significant that participants may be 
physically distanced from former comrades in that this may remove an important boost to 
their resolve. However, in order to maximise the potential of this situation, a useful tactic 
would be to use questioning techniques that lead individuals to reassess their old relations and 
to realise where there is disparity between what they expected or were promised and what 
they actually experienced. Moreover, the importance of social ties suggests the potential 
utility that these may have within D&D programs, (perhaps in a similar manner to „peer 
group therapy‟ interventions with ordinary offenders, which encourage a mutually supportive 
culture among participants).
46
 This is in line with della Porta‟s suggestion that “[a]bove 
all…exit paths from underground organizations appear to be influenced by the social 
relationships of individuals… [and] departure is made easier when collective paths are 
favoured.”
47
 This further implies that if old social ties are to be abandoned, new ones are 
likely to be necessary to fill the void, and there is considerable agreement on this issue.
48
 
This brings us to the closely related practical dimension of disengagement. At its 
simplest this involves observation of the fact that people get tired of demanding and risky 
activity, and at some point desire to attend to their individual prospects and other social 
relations outside of the group (most notably partners and family). Hence it will make sense 
for intervention programs to make alternative avenues in a security detainee‟s life salient, 
attractive, and attainable. At the same time, some form of motivational assessment would 
likely be useful. If an individual remains highly motivated towards their cause at the 
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continued expense of a possible „normal‟ life, then there is less likelihood of being induced 
by „pull‟ factors. The challenge then appears to be in reliably identifying when an individual 
is beginning to experience „burn-out,‟ or alternatively how to foster such feelings, and how 
best to capitalise on this.  
Existing Rehabilitation Programs for Islamist Extremists 
The uniqueness and complexity of the different existing programs necessarily makes 
meaningful evaluation impossible without taking an in-depth look at each individual 
program. However, this level of detail is beyond the scope of the present article. Instead, 
rather than describing individual intervention programs in great detail, the aim here is to 
identify common themes in practice and areas for potential development.  Interventions can 
be and are implemented at three points in time
49
: 1. Prior to an offence being committed, 2. 
During detention, and 3. Post-release. However, these distinctions are by no means always 
clear since in some countries individuals are often detained despite having committed no 
actual offence, and interventions that begin during detention often continue in some capacity 
after release. Broadly speaking, it still makes sense to distinguish between preventive and 
„rehabilitative‟ programs, and the focus here will primarily be upon the latter, which are 
aimed at strongly suspected and incarcerated (if not convicted) Islamist „terrorists.‟     
 Barrett and Bokhari
50
 identify four main themes in current D&D programs. These are: 
1. Re-education and rehabilitation, involving efforts to dissuade Islamist radicals from their 
religious/political ideological beliefs and narrative, 2. Providing a legitimate lifestyle by way 
of promoting family commitments and facilitating educational and vocational opportunities, 
3. Use of amnesty and restorative justice, whereby lesser crimes are forgiven and extremists 
sometimes meet with victims of terrorism, and 4. Creation of legitimate opportunities to vent 
or address grievances, e.g. via group discussion. In addition to these a fifth theme is the use 
of psychological counselling, and a sixth theme refers to program organisation (see below). 





Re-education and Rehabilitation 
The first theme, addressing ideology through religious dialogue, has been heavily emphasised 
in published accounts of most high-profile D&D programs for Islamist militants
51
 and 
appears to have been a key concept behind the inception of „deradicalisation‟. Typically, 
ideological persuasion involves using credible figures such as Islamic Sheikhs or scholars 
(e.g. Saudi Arabia
52
) or former terrorists (e.g. Indonesia
53
) to discuss and debate individual 
religious beliefs. The aim is to highlight „incorrect‟ beliefs, explain why they are mistaken 
and show the „true‟ meaning of such key concepts as jihad, takfirism (denouncing other 
Muslims) and living with non-Muslims. Most often the focus is upon the lack of theological 
legitimacy for acts of terrorism and intolerance.
54
 
 It is important to note that the particular style of intervention and the emphasis that it 
takes might vary for different individuals and is also likely to some extent to be culturally 
unique. Hence programs being run in Europe appear to be employing slightly less –though 
varying- emphasis on religion. For example, Vidino
55
 reports that in the Netherlands (a more 
preventive program) more weight is given to promoting democratic values, and Demant
56
 and 
colleagues see the promotion of alternative religious values as problematic for a secular state. 
Nevertheless, reporting on the Amsterdam municipal approach, Mellis
57
 reports that radical 
religious ideology is addressed in cases of more advanced radicalisation (similarly, in the US 
program in Iraq, these efforts are reserved more for „hard-core‟ militants, based on the 
reasoning that religious ideology is less relevant to „moderate‟ detainees
58
). Religious beliefs 
are also targeted in pre-emptive interventions in Great Britain
59
 under the rubric of the 
„Prevent‟ element of the national counter-terrorism strategy.
60
  
 Ideology has been highlighted in studies of „naturally occurring‟ deradicalisation (see 
above) and has accordingly been targeted by intervention. The relative importance of this 
component nevertheless remains debatable, as for example, one senior Indonesian police 
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officer (whilst acknowledging individual differences) commented that socio-economic 
approaches appear to be more effectual.
61
 Interestingly, disengagement efforts with right-
wing extremists in Scandinavia and Germany pay little attention to ideology, and focus far 
more on individuals‟ social and life circumstances.
62
 This brings us to the second major 
theme of providing a legitimate lifestyle, and also highlights the fact that multi-modal 
approaches (which do characterise many programs) are likely to be most effective.  
Providing a Legitimate Lifestyle 
Providing a legitimate lifestyle addresses practical, „pull‟ factors and involves an appreciation 
of the importance of social networks. As with most themes covered by D&D programs, the 
Saudi initiative seems to represent the most comprehensive, well-funded approach (not to 
mention being the best-documented).
63
 Beginning with a subject‟s detention, the needs of 
their family are assessed and a government stipend is provided based on the rationale that 
detainees would otherwise be more resentful and uncooperative, and their family would be 
more susceptible to radical influences. Families are also included within the rehabilitative 
process, e.g. in forging a pact of mutual accountability such that family members will be held 
responsible if a former detainee absconds or re-offends.
64
 Once the main counselling segment 
of the program is completed and an individual moves from detention through a halfway house 
(called the „Care Rehabilitation Centre‟) and on to being released, he is offered education, 




Of course –ethical/philosophical debates aside- the level of assistance that is offered is 
greatly dependent upon available resources, which are generally not as abundant as in Saudi 
Arabia. Singapore has also put together a rather comprehensive intervention package, 
extending many of the same benefits as the Saudis by way of numerous non-governmental 
partnership agencies.
66
 The US program in Iraq provides literacy training, basic education 







 Meanwhile in the Netherlands and UK, multi-agency networks have 
been established to tackle radicalism in communities, widely incorporating non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) as part of locally coordinated projects.
68
 Among the services offered 
for at-risk youths are vocational skills training, mentoring programs and „diversionary‟ trips 
and activities.  
The need to establish a legitimate life has not gone unappreciated, but a balance is 
required. The Saudi approach seems to involve a „no-expenses spared‟ attitude that is 
arguably over-rewarding their detainees and may be an inefficient use of resources. For those 
with less comprehensive funding (or who are simply less organised) there is also the danger 
that failing to provide benefits –especially if promised- will lead to a backlash in militant or 
criminal activity, whether for ideological or financial reasons.
69
  
For example, Ribetti reports that the demobilisation scheme for paramilitaries in 
Colombia, whilst still having positive effects, suffered in its early stages because of “an 
absolute lack of planning on the part of the government”.
70
 Benefits were not available 
according to schedule, leaving many ex-militants in difficult financial circumstances, and 
there was poor matching of individuals to appropriate training programs (e.g. many were 
unable to complete vocational training since they lacked necessary basic education). Similar 
concerns have been raised by Islamist ex-militants in Yemen
71
 and in Algeria, with one 
former fighter remarking, “I know militants who repented who have resumed Jihad because 
they were unable to work and live”.
72
 Another Algerian, a former local commander of the 
Green Death Phalanx described the situation as “administrative terrorism” commenting that 
“[it] prevents you from having access to basic things such as getting a passport (or) a birth 
certificate for your child who was born in the mountains…We feel excluded and no one 
wants to listen to us. This is not fair”.
73
  
Amnesty and Restorative Justice 
Sam Mullins 
Descriptions of the use of amnesty and restorative justice within the context of D&D 
programs for individuals have been much less comprehensive. Amnesty appears to be 
employed more often as a large-scale demobilisation tactic (e.g. as in Italy, Colombia, Egypt, 
or Algeria). In such cases the widespread offer of amnesty has been either the basis of first 
contact between governments and militants wishing to disengage, or else has affected the 
release of imprisoned militants in recognition of collective disengagement.  
The use of amnesty within D&D programs in order to influence individual 
psychology and behaviour is less clear. For example, Boucek
74
 reports that detainees who 
successfully complete the Saudi rehabilitation program are then eligible for release, except 
for those with „blood on their hands‟. He goes on to say that those with time left on their 
sentence will not be released early.
75
 This implies that only those who have not been formally 
sentenced are eligible for „amnesty,‟ and for those who have been sentenced, there is less 
incentive to bother taking part, but also less incentive to feign genuine participation if they 
do.  
The general rule appears to be that clemency may apply to less serious crimes only,
76
 
and is used at the discretion of the relevant authorities. It may involve not only legal 
pardoning but may also necessitate protection or relocation of individuals in order to avoid 
persecution or reprisals from enemies.
77
 Theoretically, amnesty shows compassion and has 
the potential to change individual „us and them‟ worldviews. In accordance with labelling 
theory,
78
 it also offers a fresh start, a chance to focus on a new life ahead. In practice, its 
effects are likely to be difficult to assess and must strike a balance between goals of 
deradicalisation, which it is indirectly related to, and the need for justice, most notably the 
concerns of victims of terrorism. This latter point links in with the notion of restorative 
justice and the potential to address the needs of victims whilst potentially furthering 
individual rehabilitation. 





Barrett and Bokhari mention that some programs do employ restorative justice tactics, 
however, they do not provide details. Ali Imron has publicly stated that he will “never stop” 
asking for forgiveness from victims and their families,
79
 but detailed descriptions of meetings 
between terrorists and victims of terrorism are lacking. Beg and Bokhari
80
 mention an 
initiative in Iraq where jihadis were encouraged to confess to their crimes and meet with the 
mothers of people they had killed. Carroll
81
 describes one such meeting:  
“"You burned my heart!" wailed the mother of a murdered son, jabbing a large, 
unshaven man in the chest."May God burn your heart! What kind of religion do you 
have?" He stared at his feet, avoiding her eyes.”  
Yet this particular initiative is a rather controversial televised affair, sometimes 
clearly involving elements of coercion
82
 (and does not appear to be related to the US-run 
program for security detainees
83
). In Northern Ireland it has also been reported that efforts at 





 description of restorative justice with ordinary criminals gives more 
insight into how these sorts of meeting might be productive. She argues that victim-offender 
mediation, where the two parties engage in a series of supervised meetings and work together 
towards a mutually acceptable reconciliation, has great potential in the sphere of hate-crimes. 
In particular it may help offenders realise the impact of their crimes and humanise their view 
of the „enemy,‟ making repeat offences less likely, whilst giving victims a sense of emotional 
„closure‟. This provides some support as well as guidelines for application with terrorists, but 
has yet to be firmly established in this field, or indeed with hate-crime offenders.
86
 As with 
D&D programs in general, it is imperative that such efforts are described in more detail and 
made available for assessment.          
Creation of Legitimate Opportunities to Voice Concerns 
Sam Mullins 
This is another strategy that has been more obviously applied as part of large-scale 
government efforts to combat terrorism. In particular this is seen in dealings with specific 
terrorist organisations by facilitating the inclusion of political wings in mainstream politics, 
such as in Northern Ireland. It seems to be something that numerous Islamist groups at 
varying stages of disengagement desire, but that has rarely been granted.
87
 As a counter-
terrorism strategy, it is supported by the fact that for many, terrorism is the first resort.
88
 
Often terrorists will not have tried alternative means of affecting change, and may therefore 
be open to less harmful and more effective strategies.   
Regarding D&D interventions, the only example utilising this strategy cited by Barrett 
and Bokhari
89
 is the Tajik Secular-Islamic Dialogue Project. The Tajik project brings together 
different groups within society to seek “means of coexistence and to identify and discuss 
issues that create mistrust and tension”
90
 and to establish solutions. It apparently does not, 
however, include more radical, violent Islamists. Efforts in the Netherlands and UK also try 
to create legitimate opportunities in so far as they promote democratic participation. These 
are more preventative projects though, and so the encouragement of legitimate means of 
protest remains untested within the realms of individual rehabilitation. In addition it is 
important to bear in mind that if such opportunities are essentially „empty‟ and do not result 
in any change, they may simply fuel frustration and eventually lead to a return to violence. It 
is thus important for ex-militants to have realistic expectations about the nature of non-
violent political activism. 
Psychological Counselling 
A number of programs utilise mental health professionals to evaluate participants and to 
address any needs or disorders that they may have. For example, the Saudi program includes 
a team of psychologists responsible for assessing psychological well-being and genuineness 
of program participation as well as establishing relations with detainees‟ families.
91
 In the 





more intensive program they also help provide courses on self-esteem.
92
 Psychologists are 
also involved in Singapore‟s program and about eighty percent of the Religious 
Rehabilitation Group that plays the primary role there has undergone training in 
psychological counselling to improve their ability to understand and relate to participants.
93
 
Meanwhile in Iraq, the US program addresses a host of potential psychological traumas 
experienced by many individuals during the course of the conflict as well as their 




 The role of psychological expertise is clearly quite varied according to context but 
seems to focus on building relations, evaluation and treatment. On the one hand these efforts 
have intuitive appeal; however regarding treatment in particular, it is pertinent to note that 
there is no clear relationship between psychological disorder and terrorism.
95
 Although this 
may be significantly different in conflict zones, there is a general risk of developing a 
„shotgun approach‟ to rehabilitation: selecting issues to assess and treat without reference to 
their theoretical relevance to terrorist behaviour, and thereby losing focus and wasting 
resources. Psychological counselling, in common with other areas of terrorist rehabilitation, 
thus warrants a great deal more research before it can be evaluated in any meaningful way.  
Program Organisation 
In addition to the above themes of content it is necessary to review organisational aspects of 
intervention. As mentioned already there is some variation in terms of governmental 
involvement. Pragmatically speaking this is likely to affect funding. For right-wing 
extremists, Bjørgo et al
96
 report that government programs also tend to exert more control 
over participants and have a greater capacity to monitor them for signs of recidivism (making 
„failures‟ all the more visible). They advise that it is important to strike a balance between 
control and trust, the latter being more forthcoming in non-governmental programs.  
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Government involvement may thus affect initial levels of trust in the scheme from 
program participants. It is obviously less likely that militants will listen to the ideological or 
religious interpretations of people they believe are their opponents. In reality though, even 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in this context must have government approval to 
be involved and are arguing for a position that is in line with state reasoning vis-à-vis 
terrorism. Even NGOs are not beyond suspicion.  
The key to overcoming this scepticism appears to be how detainees are treated and 
how messages are communicated to them. In Indonesia, where the police play an important 
role in the initiative, officers are courteous and respectful, and take time out to pray alongside 
extremists as fellow Muslims. This helps to break down misconceptions of the police as 
thoghut or un-Islamic, which may be an important first step to opening up lines of 
communication.
97
 Similarly, in Saudi Arabia there is a clear distinction between interrogation 
and later stages of „help,‟ but a persisting emphasis upon „being nice‟ to prisoners. The idea is 
to get across to them that they are not being punished, but rather that they have been led 
astray and need to be helped back onto the correct Islamic path.
98
 This appears to be a 
common approach in the Muslim world.
99
 Western authorities can also try to erode 
misconceptions through compassionate actions, and employ Muslims in combating 
extremism.
100
 But the challenge is slightly different in that the government itself is not 
Islamic and it may therefore be harder to close the distance between them.  
In line with the psychology of persuasion, it is thus important to attend to both the 
content and the source of the messages being advocated.
101
 Program staff members must be 
credible, and therefore tend to include Muslim scholars or Sheikhs, and sometimes ex-
extremists. Generally speaking though, D&D programs are a multi-disciplinary affair. In 
addition to security personnel and Islamic „counsellors,‟ professionals with a psychological 
background are also directly involved in some interventions (see above).  This is likely to be 





an important component of best practice in order to ensure a thorough approach. However, it 
will be vital for multi-disciplinary teams to show effective coordination for continuity in any 
program. Moreover, multiple agencies –both governmental and non-governmental- may be 
involved at different points throughout a detainee‟s procession through the state system. 
There is thus likely to be varying levels of communication and coordination, and the potential 
for competing interests between different parties. 
Continuing Issues in the Rehabilitation of Islamist Militants 
Perhaps the three biggest, interrelated issues for D&D programs concern who the participants 
are, risk assessment, and definitions and measurement of success. It seems that across the 
board it has so far primarily been relatively low-level militants who have not been involved 
in actual terrorist attacks who have participated and been released. This is not to say that 
more committed, hard-core extremists with a history of violence have been entirely 
excluded,
102
 but they appear to have been very much in the minority, and are far less likely to 
be offered early release.
103
 The questions which hang over these programs then, are how 
extreme participants so far have really been, what risk they have presented, and what 
behavioural and psychological changes have resulted from taking part? 
   Adequate data to begin answering these questions are not yet available. Beyond very 
limited descriptions of detainees (young men, mostly held for minor offences such as 
possessing or distributing Islamist propaganda), there has not been any publicised breakdown 
of particular offence-frequencies, of period of involvement with Islamist militants, roles 
played within organisations, or specific attitudes and beliefs that are held. As argued by 
Kruglanski and Gelfand,
104
 there is a need to develop repeat attitudinal measures in order to 
assess changes over time. They also point out that factors such as personal history, 
organisational embeddedness, current conditions, family situation, and personality variables 
(such as need for social dominance or tolerance for ambiguity) may all affect resilience to 
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change. Likewise, Speckhard asserts that programs must develop reliable ways of classifying 
program participants according to their level of radicalisation and that this requires an 
assessment tool to be used before, during and after treatment.
105
 Unless such data are 




 At present, risk-assessment generally appears to be a case of clinical judgement by 
those responsible for implementing specific programs and involves taking stock of a number 
of different factors which do not necessarily involve any clear, standardised system of 
measurement, nor do they necessarily relate to one another –or to theoretical explanations of 
terrorism- in any systematic way. In both mental health practice more generally, and in 
rehabilitation efforts with ordinary offenders, clinical judgement has been shown to be 
inferior to actuarial assessment using standardised tools that are structured, quantitative, and 
linked to relevant criteria.
107
 There is clearly a desperate need for improvement in the 
assessment of terrorists (more below) and accordingly, current research is addressing this 
issue. Speckhard, and Kruglanski and Gelfand are clearly pioneering in this respect but 
precise details of their methods have yet to be published. Of particular note in this area is 
Pressman‟s work in developing the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA), which is 
an attempt at establishing a Structured Professional Judgement (SPJ) tool for use with 
terrorist populations.
108
 Pressman‟s approach is a prime example of the underlying argument 
in this paper (i.e. that terrorism researchers can learn from criminology) in that it is inspired 
by existing, validated SPJ tools for violent offenders, and yet the particular content of the 
assessment is appropriately informed by theory and research on terrorism. Although still in 
the early stages of development this is a step in the right direction.     
 Program success is undoubtedly related to who participants are, and what risk they 
pose. It may also incorporate varying levels of intermediate and superseding goals. 





Intermediate goals might include behavioural changes whilst incarcerated (e.g. increased 
interaction and openness with staff) as well as changes in self-reported attitudes. The 
ultimate, ideal goal is of course permanent behavioural disengagement from involvement 
with Islamist terrorists- no collaboration with them, no supporting or promoting them, and 
especially no violence. The focus thus far has been upon recidivism in terms of committing a 
security-related offence; however details have been vague and it is unclear whether the 
distinction is always made between suspicion, arrest, conviction or some other form of 
confirmation. Table 1 below illustrates known numbers of participants, releases and repeat 




Table 1. Numbers of participants, releases & repeat offenders in current D&D programs up 
until the end of 2007 (mid-2008 for Iraq). 
 
* Release confirmed as direct result of D&D program. 
 
It is important to note that only in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Yemen
110
 are the 
releases explicitly cited to be a direct result of program participation (e.g. the 150 released in 
Indonesia were largely part of general amnesties
111
). These two cases and that of Iraq are the 
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only ones for which rates of recidivism have been reported (it was more recently made public 
that at least 14 individuals jailed for terrorism offences in Indonesia have reoffended, but it is 
unclear whether they were among those released prior to 2008
112
). In the case of Saudi Arabia 
these numbers refer to individuals re-arrested for security-related offences.
113
 Meanwhile in 
Yemen recidivism figures refer to two former program participants killed in Iraq
114
 and it is 
unspecified what the 12 Iraqis listed were rearrested for.  These translate into extremely low 
rates of recidivism, and although figures are not reported for the other cases it is worth noting 
that there are high levels of monitoring and continued restrictions on the movements of 
former detainees in these countries.  
 Nevertheless, since base-rates of re-offending are unknown for populations of 
terrorists, and there are no control groups for comparison, these rates do not necessarily 
reflect a significant effect of the respective interventions. Speckhard reports that prior to the 
implementation of the program in Iraq, “the usual recidivism rate from previous years [was] 
close to 200”,
115
 which is encouraging but this by itself cannot be considered a measurement 
of efficacy. The period of time since released –especially without supervision- is also 
unknown, but likely no more than two or three years in the longest cases. Finally, offences 
committed in relation to original offences are unknown- for example an increase in severity 
might indicate a detrimental effect of intervention for those individuals, whilst a decrease 
might still be considered a positive effect despite „failure.‟ Degrees of recidivism therefore 
need to be defined.   
Summary of Existing Programs 
In summary, existing programs vary a great deal in almost every respect. A focus on ideology 
and religion has so far been the most promoted aspect of programs, and a great deal of effort 
has been put into enlisting credible sources of information or program interlocutors
116
, and 
developing convincing arguments. Based on theoretical understanding of involvement in 





extremist organisations, and accounts of why people leave them, it is also vitally important to 
address social concerns, which most programs do. It is tempting to compare these two 
approaches and ask which is most useful, however this would be counterproductive and miss 
the point that both are important, and it is the combination that is most likely to be effective. 
Other approaches, such as restorative justice techniques, and providing alternative avenues of 
expression are certainly promising but are as yet underutilised and poorly documented, while 
psychological counselling techniques, although potentially valuable, are not always clearly 
theoretically relevant or coordinated. 
 A commendable point is that programs do appear to some extent to utilise the 
potential for groups of individuals to support each other‟s individual rehabilitation. This is 
apparent in the fact that intervention seems to typically involve a good deal of group 
interaction. However, there may yet be further opportunities to cultivate mutual self-helping 
(e.g. by way of enlisting the help of detainees who are further along in the program to 
welcome newcomers). Equally, the potential for negative influences within groups must be 
recognised and plans for dealing with this developed. 
Referring to other theoretical implications, discussed above, there are no reports that 
the collective situation of relevant terrorist organisations are monitored in order to be 
exploited in facilitating individual reform (although this might still take place in practice). 
Also, there is only limited evidence that program staff attempt to highlight negative aspects 
of extremist involvement (though again, intuitively this seems likely). One example is the 




There is a continued need to improve risk assessment and to be able to identify and 
cultivate feelings of burn-out, neither of which are dealt with in detail in existing descriptions 
of D&D programs. Finally, from an academic and perhaps idealistic perspective (since this 
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conflicts with security-related and political concerns) there is a great need to improve the 
quality of available information in order to facilitate more accurate evaluation. Indeed, the 
preceding overview belies the complexity involved in each program and detailed case studies 
are required in order to advance current levels of understanding. Moving beyond individual 
assessments in the search for common factors relating to positive outcomes, analysts will also 
be faced with the challenge of coming up with a framework that is able to accommodate the 
vast differences between programs. Horgan and Braddock suggest that Multi Attribute Utility 




Initial, optimistic impressions of these interventions have been based on extremely 
limited data and an understandable enthusiasm for a new and exciting area of innovation in 
counter-terrorism. However, as practitioners and analysts come to grips with the complexity 
of conceptual issues involved, the general outlook has become more critical.
119
 Although 
rehabilitation programs for ordinary offenders are by no means free from controversy, there is 
a wealth of relevant experience, theoretical development and research that can be drawn 
upon, that may help clarify certain concepts and inspire new ways of thinking about 
rehabilitating terrorists. 
Rehabilitation Programs with Ordinary Offenders 
Having described key themes in practice with Islamist terrorists, it is useful to consider how 
these programs compare to the rehabilitation of ordinary offenders. Whilst this is an 
extremely diverse field
120
 that is far from being an exact science, there is over fifty 
cumulative years of research to build upon. Of course working with „everyday‟ criminals and 
terrorists is not the same, and rehabilitation programs cannot simply be cut and pasted from 
one context to the other. But with careful consideration for similarities and differences (in 
terms of subjects, content, organisation and culture), it is possible that those with an interest 





in D&D programs can learn from the experience of criminology. In particular this may help 
to highlight the multitude of conceptual and practical issues involved, to mould realistic 
expectations about the challenges ahead, and to generate ideas for improving current practice 
and evaluation. Specific offender rehabilitation programs (such as Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation, Sex Offender Treatment Programs) are of interest and are worth examining on 
an individual basis. However, the nature of offences and the specific content of programs will 
always be different. Therefore the aim here is to give an overview of principles of best 
practice in criminal rehabilitation, as well as relevant challenges. This will be followed by a 
consideration of the extent to which these principles might apply to working with Islamist 
terrorists.  
A Brief History of Criminal Rehabilitation 
Psychological approaches to offender rehabilitation gained momentum in the 1950‟s and 
‟60‟s. However, from the 1970‟s onwards the idea that „nothing works‟ took hold, based 
upon a particular review of treatment by Martinson.
121
 This conclusion was later recanted and 
the original paper criticised,
122
 but at the time it gelled with a shift to the political right in the 
US and UK, and with sociological theories pointing to the role of society over individuals in 
causing crime (criminology‟s „root causes‟).
123
 There was a resurgence in the rehabilitative 
ideal in both policy and practice during the 1990‟s, inspired by a growing body of meta-
analytical reviews demonstrating a consistent impact upon recidivism.
124
 Since then a 
plethora of rehabilitative programs has emerged, some targeting specific types of offender, 
others more generalised.  
Efficacy  
Amidst the diversity of programs in existence there is variation in subjects (different types of 
offenders) content, organisation, setting, quality of implementation, and „dosage‟ (average 
time spent in treatment). Program evaluations are similarly diverse, methods of measurement 
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and chosen criteria vary widely, and detail is often lacking, making it difficult to discern 
meaning from individual assessments or to compare multiple studies. In trying to overcome 
the shortcomings of individual studies criminologists have used meta-analysis to 
quantitatively assess program efficacy at the aggregate level. This enables calculation of an 
overall effect size
125
 on recidivism despite varying operational definitions in different studies, 
and further enables researchers to establish correlations between factors of interest (e.g. 
different types of offenders) and the overall result, thus indicating whether or not they have a 
moderating effect on treatment.
126
 Although this is not currently feasible to evaluate D&D 
programs (a minimum requirement is a significant number of detailed assessments with 
relatively large samples)
127
 it is widely used in criminology. The average effect size produced 
in meta-analytical review is a reduction between ten and twelve percent in recidivism across 
different types of offenders compared to matched control groups.
128
  
This may not seem impressive but nevertheless represents a significant impact in 
terms of costs to individuals and society. Moreover, meta-analysis of the effects of punitive 
approaches and incarceration consistently demonstrate that this does not reduce recidivism, 
and in fact often increases rates of re-offending (Lipsey and Cullen
129
 found this kind of 
boomerang effect in 5 out of 7 meta-analyses of incarceration). Furthermore, programs which 
adhere to increasingly established principles of best practice (see below) have been shown to 
reduce recidivism on average by 17-35%.
130
 The context of this result is that studies often 
report quite high rates of recidivism among criminal populations- it is not uncommon to come 
across reports of more than 40% of control groups being rearrested or even reconvicted 




In a UK Home Office study examining the effects of Cognitive Behavioural 
Treatment (CBT) for a variety of different adult offenders, reconviction rates at two-year 





follow up among the control groups ranged from 8% to 80% depending upon risk-level (for 
the treatment groups this range was 5% to 75% but with larger reductions occurring in 
medium risk-level groups).
132
 Recidivism is thus a serious problem among criminal 
populations and is not easily overcome: indeed, despite continued efforts to improve criminal 
rehabilitation –and even under ideal circumstances- it is taken as a given that an often 
significant proportion of criminals will reoffend. What‟s more, precisely who will and will 
not reoffend cannot be predicted with absolute certainty.
133
 
Despite overall consensus that criminal rehabilitation can be effective, there are some 
important caveats. Critics of the findings from meta-analysis point out that these results are 
potentially misleading since they are mostly based on programs which have been set up 
specifically for demonstration and research.
134
 As such they have adequate resources and are 
often run by the researchers who designed the program, along with appropriately trained staff 
(„therapeutic integrity‟- see below), while „real life‟, „routine‟ programs face numerous 
organisational difficulties, they experience „drift‟ away from the original plan over time, and 





  found that the vast majority of almost 400 individual offender treatment 
programs assessed using the Correctional Program Assessment Inventory (CPAI-2000) did 
not receive a passing grade, and Gendreau, Goggin and Smith
137
 report that seventy percent 
of 282 programs assessed using an earlier version of the CPAI also „failed‟. The gap between 
theory and research on one hand, and practice on the other, is thought to be “enormous” (see 
Gendreau et al
138
 for specific program deficits) and one of the greatest challenges for 
researchers in this field is trying to bridge that gap.
139
   
A related point that is important to appreciate is that the positive effects found in 
meta-analysis are at the aggregate level. Lipsey and Cullen thus point out that “no [particular] 




[emphasis added]. Criminologists are thus still striving to improve their understanding of 
rehabilitation and have devoted considerable effort to identifying factors which relate to more 
successful treatments (larger effect sizes on recidivism) within meta-analyses. This had led to 
the identification of several principles of best practice. 
What Works and What Doesn’t 
Despite an inability to come up with the „perfect‟ program, general agreement has now 
emerged as to the components of more (and less) effective rehabilitative interventions.
141
 
Less effective –sometimes even counterproductive- practices include psychodynamic or non-
directive therapies, a focus on punishment, and a failure to address issues related to 
offending.  
The following are consistently cited as being more effective at reducing recidivism:
142
  
 Adherence to principles of Risk, Need, and Responsivity (RNR, see below). 
 Cognitive-behavioural interventions (focus on rewarding appropriate behaviour, 
behavioural practice and role-play, addressing pro-criminal attitudes, enhancing 
relevant cognitive skills). 
 A firm-but-fair and interpersonally sensitive approach to participants.  
 A structured, well-designed program based on empirically validated theory (usually 
incorporating elements of social learning theory). 
 High quality training of staff. 
 High treatment integrity (the extent to which the program is conducted according to 
theory and design). 
 A conducive setting (community-based programs are often found to be more 
effective). 
The Risk Principle 





The principles of „Risk‟, „Need‟ and „Responsivity‟ have been developed by Andrews and 
colleagues and are believed to lie at the heart of best practice.
143
 Thus Bonta and Andrews
144
 
found that programs adhering to all three RNR principles produced larger reductions in 
recidivism (which were further increased in community settings).  
The Risk principle states that more intense levels of service provision should be 
reserved for higher-risk offenders since there is more room for change and this results in 
greater reductions in recidivism. Treatment of higher-risk offenders has been found to relate 
to larger reductions in recidivism in meta-analysis,
145
 while focussing efforts on lower risk 
offenders can sometimes result in increased rates of reoffending (since this increases their 
criminal peer-associations)
146
. However, Smith et al‟s
147
 review of meta-analyses reveals that 
the support on this issue is inconsistent as compared to other factors, which they suggest is 
due to varying definitions of risk-level and paucity of available information in studies.  
Risk-assessment tools have advanced from „first generation‟ (unstructured clinical 
judgement) through to „fourth generation‟ (theoretically and empirically derived, including 
both static and dynamic factors for repeated measurement, and designed to inform the 
rehabilitation process through identifying specific „criminogenic needs‟, i.e. issues relating to 
offending behaviour, which can be targeted in intervention).
148
 The improvements over 
clinical judgement are unquestionable
149
, and researchers are generally able to distinguish 
between high, medium and low-risk categories of offenders
150
; however the overall predictive 
ability of risk-assessment tools remains only moderately accurate, no single instrument or 
type of assessment has been found to be superior
151




The Need Principle 
The Need principle states that interventions must target „criminogenic needs‟, i.e. 
factors which directly relate to offending behaviour (and therefore are indicative of risk). 
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Andrews, Bonta and Wormith identify eight empirically supported risk/need factors, which 
they refer to as the „Central Eight‟. The „Big Four‟ among these „criminogenic‟ variables 
include:  
 Offence history,  
 Antisocial personality traits (such as impulsivity and aggressiveness),  
 Pro-criminal attitudes (including rationalisations for crime), and  





Among these variables, only offence history is static and therefore unchangeable. The 
inclusion of dynamic factors enables repeated assessment of change and therefore of 
treatment impact over time. The remaining four risk/need factors are also dynamic and 
include:  individual substance abuse, family/marital relationships, school or work life, and 
leisure activities.
154
 Importantly, several minor, „non-criminogenic‟ needs are also identified, 
which if targeted in intervention may improve an individual‟s well-being, but are unlikely to 
affect offending behaviour. These include self-esteem, personal/emotional distress, major 
mental disorder, and physical health.
155
 Smith et al report that although relatively few meta-
analyses have been conducted which specifically examine the need principle, the current 
evidence is strongly supportive.
156
    
The Responsivity Principle 
Lastly, the principle of Responsivity states that programs must be implemented in a 
style that maximises learning potential. General responsivity calls for the use of cognitive-
behavioural techniques and social learning, utilising such methods as modelling, gradual 
shaping of behaviour through reinforcement and identification and modification of 
maladaptive thought patterns via cognitive restructuring. Specific responsivity suggests that 





treatment delivery (including matching subjects to suitable staff members) must be adapted to 
suit individual offender characteristics.
157
 Smith et al‟s recent review of meta-analytical 
studies reveals that cognitive-behavioural interventions for offenders have been consistently 
found to result in greater reductions in recidivism than interventions that do not employ these 
methods. Specific responsivity, however, remains under-researched. 
Program Design, Implementation and Evaluation 
 RNR principles and other recommendations relating to style of delivery can be 
considered content variables. Meanwhile, organisational variables relate to issues of design, 
implementation and evaluation. Cooke and Philip
158
 provide an extremely useful breakdown 
of how to ensure treatment integrity through solid organisation and although some of their 
advice might seem generic (e.g. need for adequate resources, potential negative impact of 
intra-organisational conflict) a thorough approach avoids making assumptions and ensures 
that details are not overlooked. Three key areas stand out as particularly relevant: 1. The 
theoretical framework should be empirically validated, and what exactly will be targeted –
and how- must be clearly identified; 2. There must be a comprehensive program manual that 
is well-researched and details the design, setting up, running and evaluation of the program 
(including such details as number of planned sessions, and how to achieve stated objectives); 
and 3. Monitoring and evaluation of all aspects of the programs are fundamentally important 
to its success. The latter helps maintain program integrity and assessment of whether the 
intervention is affecting a) short-term process variables, b) outcome variables or ultimate 
goals, and c) whether it is cost-effective.
159
 
Gendreau, Goggin and Smith
160
 take an equally detailed approach in offering advice 
on the implementation of programs in the „real world‟ and identify four key areas to attend to 
relating to organisational factors, the program itself, the agent of change (who is responsible 
for running the program), and staffing activities.
161
 They also emphasise the importance of 
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program evaluation and suggest the use of the CPAI for this purpose. The latest version of 
this tool, the CPAI-2000,
162
 includes 131 items and assesses eight different domains: 1. 
Organisational culture, 2. Program implementation/maintenance, 3. Management/staff 
characteristics, 4. Client risk-need practices, 5. Program characteristics, 6. Core correctional 
practices, 7. Interagency communication, and 8. Evaluation. CPAI scores have been found to 
relate to reductions in recidivism, thus adding validity both to this assessment, and by proxy 





How Might General Principles of Criminal Rehabilitation Apply to D&D Programs 
with Islamist Terrorists? 
Although the potential relevance of criminology has not been overlooked,
164
 there has not 
previously been any systematic attempt to explore how principles of best practice in ordinary 
rehabilitation might apply to similar efforts with Islamist terrorists. Before elaborating on 
what specific lessons might be learned from criminology it is useful to briefly consider in 
what ways populations of criminals and terrorists are similar and different, with an eye to 
assessing transferability.  
Comparison of Populations 
In terms of profiles, terrorists are overwhelmingly males. Although females do make up a 
larger comparative proportion of criminal populations, males are responsible for more crime 
overall –especially violent crime- and most research is with male offenders.
165
  
It is generally accepted that terrorists on the whole are free from psychopathology and 
rates of disorder are low.
166
 While “a third or more of prisoners show some form of mental 
disorder…this is mainly a reflection of high rates of alcohol and drug abuse and personality 
disorder…[and] these are the disorders whose status as mental illnesses is contentious within 







 Although it is sometimes reported that prisoners‟ rates are higher,
168
 overall 
“[i]t is unclear whether the rates of disorder in prisoners are significantly different from 
general population rates.”
169
 Criminologists may be faced more often with the added 
difficulty of treating some form of disorder as part of rehabilitation. However, except for 
antisocial personality traits, these are likely to be secondary goals, while primary targets 
remain „criminogenic needs‟ (see above) and the overall design of these programs is aimed at 
being generally appropriate for human consumption.
170
  
A further concern might be to do with socioeconomic background. We are reminded 
time and again that terrorists are extremely heterogeneous and many often come from middle 
or even upper classes, with good education and sometimes a professional career. Criminal 
populations are also extremely diverse, but tend to be typified as being from lower classes 
with poor education and below average IQ.
171
 This might imply that style of intervention 
should be quite different to suit apparent differences in learning ability.  
However, it should be noted that upper class Islamist militants were more prevalent at 
the beginning of the movement, and have become less prevalent over time, so that the 
majority of „foot soldiers‟ (likely to make up the bulk of participants in D&D programs) are 
lower or middle class.
172
 In the Saudi program, only a very small proportion of participants 
have come from more affluent backgrounds, and in a study of 639 of these, around a quarter 
had a criminal background.
173
 This is the same proportion reported among Bakker‟s sample 
of operational („hard-core‟) Islamist terrorists in Europe.
174
  
Hence there is considerable overlap in criminal and terrorist populations. Based on 
this, there is no evidence to suggest that criminals and terrorists have fundamentally different 
cognitive styles with respect to capacity to learn or resistance to change, and the limited 
evidence that does exist suggests that if there are differences, they may well be marginal. 
Indeed, the definitive nature of participants should not be assumed one way or the other, but 
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assessed at intake and dealt with accordingly (hence the need for some flexibility and 
individual tailoring of treatment).    
It is also worth noting that criminals and terrorists show a great deal of similarity in a 
number of other ways. In particular they show similar systems of social influence and 
organisation, they show similar pathways into their respective illegal activities, and their 
specific sense of social identity is also important.
175
 Perhaps the most significant difference 
from a psychological perspective is in particular aspects of social identity. The fact that 
terrorists feel that they represent a wider collective, and that they often have altruistic, 
politicised motivations, separates them from most criminals. However, this should be looked 
upon as a potential asset to be exploited in rehabilitative interventions, for example in 
promoting alternative avenues of pro-social action. 
Finally, LaFree and Miller
176
 recently explored the utility of criminological accounts 
of desistance in ordinary offenders for understanding similar processes in terrorism, and 
found this to be a useful theoretical approach. Similarly, Horgan
177
 explores the concept of 
„secondary‟ (i.e. long-term) desistance in ordinary criminals for understanding terrorist 
disengagement. Hence there are parallels apparent in criminal and terrorist 
desistance/disengagement, and they may cease their respective activities for some of the same 
reasons.  
As a caveat, it is not the intention here to suggest that criminal and terrorist 
populations are the same (even within broad samples), that differences are not significant, or 
that practice with offenders will directly apply to Islamist militants. Rather, the aim is to 
demonstrate that there is sufficient similarity that lessons learned from working with ordinary 
offenders will be relevant to working with Islamist terrorists, although the exact structure and 
content of programs will always be context-specific. Indeed, even though Pressman 









Applicability of Principles of Best Practice 
Firstly, in terms of what doesn’t work with ordinary offenders, the same seems likely to hold 
true for terrorists. There is no reason to believe that psychodynamic or nondirective 
approaches, a punitive approach, or failing to address needs directly related to militant 
behaviour will be effective in D&D programs. These are important lessons to learn given that 
such approaches can sometimes increase recidivism, which would be disastrous. „What not to 
do‟ is thus crucial, and although it applies across different areas of intervention, it may be 
particularly relevant to psychological counselling with Islamist terrorists. The issue is not 
only how any psychological disorders or deficits are addressed but also whether or not they 
are relevant to offending behaviour, and whether they represent appropriate targets for 
intervention aimed at reducing recidivism. This will likely be context-specific and will 
require careful research. We now turn to „what works‟ in criminology. 
Risk 
 Regarding the Risk principle, the question remains as to whether it would be more 
productive to focus upon higher risk (more committed) cases. Of course, as with criminals, 
there are those who are beyond rehabilitation, but “[e]ven the beliefs of deeply committed 
extremists may be subject to more change than we have expected.”
179
 Yet D&D interventions 
so far seem to have shied away from higher risk cases (except for those who have seemingly 
„self-rehabilitated‟), and there is thus a good possibility that resources are being used 
inefficiently. Accounts of the programs in Singapore and Iraq do mention that different levels 
of risk are distinguished;
180
 however, in order to assess whether the Risk principle applies in 
terrorism, it is first necessary to develop reliable and valid risk-assessment tools. This follows 
Kruglanski and Gelfand‟s
181




to develop a risk-assessment tool for „violent political extremists‟. Risk-assessment must take 
into account issues such as militant history (roles played and length of time in the 
organisation), which is static, but also dynamic factors such as specific patterns of ideological 
belief, (which may be reflected in use of language as reflected in „explanatory styles‟ or 
„personal narratives‟
183
). It should include an assessment of motivations for initial and 
continued involvement (economic, ideological/ religious, and social), as well as motivation 
for changing one‟s current situation („readiness‟ for disengagement). This should form the 
corner stone of treatment design for specific individuals.
184
 
 Without detracting from the importance of developing systematic risk-assessment for 
Islamist militants, it is equally important to have realistic expectations about what such tools 
might achieve. Decades of research and practice with ordinary offenders has achieved only 
moderate predictability and part of the problem here –in addition to the complexity of human 
behaviour- are the relatively low base-rates of criminal behaviour, which necessarily reduce 
the likelihood of predictive ability. As Roberts and Horgan
185
 point out, it depends upon 
context and the specific behaviours that are being predicted, but the generally very low rate of 
violent terrorist activity (the „tip of the iceberg‟) means that this will be exceptionally 
difficult to predict, perhaps even more so than criminal violence. This is not to say that 
terrorist risk-assessment will be impossible or fruitless –indeed it should be expected to 
produce significant advantages over unstructured „clinical‟ judgements- but it will be far from 
infallible. 
Need 
 As for Need, it seems equally important for D&D programs to focus upon factors 
which directly relate to involvement in Islamist terrorism. Descriptions of these programs do 
indicate that this is the case. Both cognitions (ideology, beliefs), and social circumstances 
(peer associations, family) are addressed. In terms of the „Central Eight‟ and „Big Four‟ 





(above) identified by Andrews et al
186
 as lying at the heart of risk/needs assessment, the 
relevance of these in the context of working with terrorists requires testing. Nevertheless, 
despite less obvious relevance of antisocial personality traits and substance abuse (which 
might both still affect amenability to intervention when present) the remaining six 
criminogenic factors (offence history, attitudes, social situation, family, school/work, and 
leisure) are attended to in D&D programs. The next step will be to examine the empirical 
relationships between these different variables and offending-related behaviours of interest, 
which will help inform risk-assessment and targets of intervention. 
Responsivity 
The principle of Responsivity is also relevant. However, it is unclear to what extent existing 
programs employ cognitive-behavioural techniques (as suggested in order to maximise 
learning and adaptation), or to what extent individual „tailoring‟ is employed. As a general 
rule, and with ideological argumentation in mind, it should be noted that verbal, logical 
argument is unlikely to be a universally well-received format for learning. With regards to 
cognitive-behavioural techniques, it is not necessarily the specific content used in offender 
rehabilitation programs that is relevant, although this will vary. For example, self-control or 
impulsivity are often targeted in criminal offender interventions, which may have limited 
significance in terrorism. On the other hand, problem solving skills, critical reasoning and 
social perspective taking are also popular,
187
 and these may have some applicability to 
terrorists. It will, however, very likely prove useful to adhere to more general principles of 
cognitive-behavioural treatment in practice with Islamist militants. This might include 
rewards for appropriate behaviour, and cognitive rehearsal and behavioural practice in role 
plays for dealing with certain situations. For example, in preparing individuals for release, it 
might help to rehearse strategies for dealing with „bumping into‟ old associates or known 
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radicals. Efforts to maximise potential for learning and persuasion will likely bolster existing 
and future efforts at terrorist rehabilitation. 
Organisation and Evaluation 
Organisational principles of best practice may have direct applicability in many cases. The 
contributions from criminologists on this topic provide a framework for thinking about how 
to design and run a rehabilitative program for terrorists. These and other accounts (such as 
how to go about assessing cost-effectiveness
188
) should be referred to and then adapted 
according to the unique circumstances and treatment setting. In particular, the three key 
points discussed above are especially relevant; namely the need for an empirically validated 
theoretical framework, the need for a detailed program manual, and the need for built-in 
evaluation as a means of monitoring program integrity and validity. Adopting these measures 
–although by no means a straightforward affair- will help to professionalise rehabilitative 
practice with Islamist terrorists and will be fundamental to assessing efficacy and improving 
practice.  
With these principles in mind it is of course important to recall that there is a vast 
variation in current D&D programs, some of which are ad hoc and have little in the way of 
discernible structure. Just as there is a deep and persisting gap between theory and practice in 
offender rehabilitation, there is likely to be an even greater one in the field of terrorism. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The present article has offered an overview of current practice in rehabilitation of Islamist 
terrorists, and has added to the pioneering work of numerous others by examining the 
potential for the rehabilitation of ordinary offenders to inform parallel practice with terrorists. 
Individual and collective processes of disengagement and deradicalisation are intimately 
related to one another. Existing D&D programs for Islamist extremists are aimed at the 
individual level of disengagement and deradicalisation, but should also show an awareness of 





how this might relate to the wider collective. Existing interventions focus on two main areas: 
1. Re-education and rehabilitation, and 2. Providing a legitimate lifestyle (ideological and 
social components, respectively). Psychological counselling is also a component in more 
developed programs. Restorative justice practices and providing legitimate opportunities for 
protest or action show promise but as yet appear to be underutilised. Organisationally, 
programs show mixed governmental and non-governmental involvement, and often there is 
multi-agency cooperation. Continuing issues in D&D practice include the (low) level of 
militancy of participants, initial and ongoing risk assessment, and program transparency and 
evaluation.  
 Rehabilitation programs for ordinary offenders are extremely diverse, with diverse 
outcomes. However, a greater level of knowledge exists about what does and doesn‟t work, 
and how principles of best practice should be implemented. The specific content of these 
programs compared to working with terrorists will always differ, but there is sufficient 
similarity between participant populations and program aims that lessons may be learned 
from the criminal context. The principles of Risk, Need and Responsivity all show potential 
application in the rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists, and to some extent are already being 
implemented, or are in development. D&D programs may face many of the same 
organisational challenges and may learn directly from principles of best practice in this 
regard, although unique contexts will also present substantial challenges. It is equally 
important to be aware of practices which may be detrimental to rehabilitative efforts, and 
lessons learned from criminology are also relevant here.     
 In addition to providing a framework for understanding and increasing awareness of 
the multitude of different issues involved in rehabilitative practice, criminology‟s value is 
that it also illuminates many of the same conceptual and practical obstacles that will plague 
parallel practice with Islamist terrorists. This in itself is sobering; however it is even more 
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daunting to consider that many of these obstacles (e.g. difficulties in defining such 
fundamental criteria as offences, recidivism or desistance; lack of data; coming up with 
viable methodologies for research and evaluation; having to cope with organisational politics) 
are amplified with terrorism. A comparative perspective is thus also important for 
comprehending the scale of certain challenges and for shaping realistic expectations about 
what might be achieved. In the long run this may be crucial to the continued survival of these 
programs.  
The rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists is a practice in its infancy. It faces many 
unique challenges but can equally learn from related practices. It also presents unique 
opportunities to understand more about extremism, and –given the special status of terrorists 
and currently high level of resources being invested- may feed back into what we know about 
rehabilitation more generally. As with crime, both „reform‟ and „relapse‟ are processes, not 
single events, and failures will be inevitable. The enormity of the task should not deter 
researchers from striving to advance the field; rather it is an indication of the necessity for a 
concerted and thoughtful drive towards progress.  
Finally, as a caveat, it should be emphasised that this has been a very general review. 
Principles of best practice with offenders are based primarily upon white, male, adult 
offenders in the Western world (thereby limiting transferability), and information on the 
specific content of D&D programs is generally lacking. What is needed is a detailed, in-depth 
consideration for how specific techniques might apply in culturally unique situations, along 
with greater theoretical development in order to build a more comprehensive understanding 
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